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Source: *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 585-595

Published by: [National Council on Family Relations](http://www.nationalcouncilonfamilyrelations.org)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/353719>

Accessed: 09/09/2011 04:49

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Husbands' Participation in Domestic Labor: Interactive Effects of Wives' and Husbands' Gender Ideologies

The literature suggests that gender ideology—how a person identifies herself or himself in terms of marital and family roles traditionally linked to gender—is related to the division of labor in the home. In this article I assert that it is not sufficient to merely examine the main effects of wives' and husbands' gender ideologies. Rather, it is essential to consider the interaction between the ideologies of wives and their husbands in order to understand how a division of household labor emerges. I hypothesize that a husband's gender ideology will not be related to the division of household labor for men married to traditional wives, but that it will be for men with egalitarian wives. An empirical test using data provided by 2,719 married couples from the National Survey of Families and Households confirms this hypothesis. Even after controlling for measures of market- and marital-specific capital, wives' and husbands' gender ideologies interact in terms of their effects on the division of household labor. Husbands do relatively little domestic labor unless both they and their wives are relatively egalitarian in their beliefs about gender and marital roles.

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Key Words: division of household labor, domestic labor, gender ideology, housework.

Gender-based inequality in the division of household labor has become a key issue for scholars of marriage and the family. One of the more intriguing findings in this literature has been the relative insensitivity of the division of household labor to recent increases in women's labor force participation. Even though married mothers are more than twice as likely to be employed full-time today as in 1970, the division of household labor seems to have changed hardly at all: Married men still do relatively little domestic labor.

Although it appears that husbands of employed women contribute more hours of household work than do husbands of nonemployed women, these differences tend to be relatively small. Demo and Acock (1993), for example, found that although husbands of employed wives contribute on average 4.3 more hours per week to chores than do husbands of nonemployed wives, the division of household labor remains strikingly unequal: Employed wives' proportion of total hours spent on household chores is still about 72%, compared with about 81% for nonemployed wives.

The consensus of the empirical literature is that the division of household labor tends to be relatively traditional—that is, the wife performs a far greater proportion of household tasks than does her husband—in households where the wife earns more than her husband (Atkinson & Boles,

1984) and even in households where the husband is not employed (Brayfield, 1992). This combination of market and nonmarket work is likely to force married women into working what Hochschild calls the "second-shift" (Hochschild, 1989b).

Not only do married women perform far more household labor than their husbands, but the kinds of household tasks performed by wives and husbands differ. Many researchers (for example, Blair & Lichter, 1991; Brayfield, 1992; Lennon & Rosenfeld, 1994; Mederer, 1993) note that household labor remains highly segregated by sex. Those tasks that have been traditionally thought of as "women's work" (for example, cooking, laundry, housecleaning) are performed primarily by women, and "male" tasks such as yard work and auto maintenance are done primarily by men. Lennon and Rosenfeld report that men do about 70% of the traditionally male tasks, and women perform about 75% of the traditionally female tasks.

To explain these inequalities in task allocation and in task type, social scientists have developed at least four major conceptual approaches. The relative resources (or resource bargaining) approach takes an exchange-based perspective. The division of household labor is seen to result from implicit negotiation between spouses over inputs (e.g., earnings) and outcomes (e.g., who does the housework) in the household. In general, the research literature supports this perspective (see, for example, Blair & Lichter, 1991; Ferree, 1991; Kamo, 1988).

The time availability perspective draws on human capital theory (see, for example, Becker, 1991) and focuses on how family members' time is allocated between market and domestic work. This perspective implies that there should be a strong association between the number of hours a wife works outside the home and the number of hours she spends doing domestic work. Although most studies find an increase in hours spent in housework by husbands of employed wives, these differences tend to be rather small.

The economic dependency model (see, for example, Brines, 1993) suggests that housework is "women's work" because wives are economically dependent on their husbands. Because of this dependency, wives can be expected to allocate more time to domestic work than their husbands. Brines' (1993) research supports this model; she finds a negative relationship between support provided and time spent on housework.

The fourth approach—that of gender ideology—is the focus of this article. Gender ideologies are how a person identifies herself or himself with regard to marital and family roles that are traditionally linked to gender. Gender ideology can be distinguished from gender identity, which Goffman (1977) suggests is "the deepest sense of what one is" (p. 315), in that gender identities are self-definitions such as male or female, while ideologies are the elements that make up that definition. For example, two men who think of themselves as male (their gender identity) can have very different ideas about what being male implies (their gender ideologies). One man may assert that being male means believing that domestic labor is "women's work," while another man may feel that being male means doing an equal share of household work. Marriage and other intimate relationships provide arenas in which these ideologies are played out. In addition to its manifest functions of providing emotional and economic support and enhancing childbearing and child-rearing, marriage also serves the latent function of providing an opportunity for husbands and wives to behave in ways that validate their identities as male and female, that is, to display the visible aspects of their gender ideologies.

Scholars employing this perspective have assumed that activities such as the routine performance (or nonperformance) of household chores will reflect the gender ideologies of husbands and their wives. They hypothesize that the division of household labor in marriages of women and men holding more traditional beliefs about gender and marital roles will be relatively traditional—that is, the wife will do the bulk of the domestic labor—but couples holding less traditional (i.e., more egalitarian) ideologies will have a more balanced division of labor. The findings of studies employing the gender ideology perspective have been generally consistent with this prediction (e.g., Blair & Lichter, 1991; Hiller & Philliber, 1986; Kamo, 1988; Presser, 1994; Sanchez, 1994); husbands holding more egalitarian gender ideologies tend to perform more hours of housework and a greater proportion of household labor, and traditionally oriented husbands tend to do less. However, some researchers either have failed to find such an effect (e.g., Coverman, 1985; Crouter, Perry-Jenkins, Huston, & McHale, 1987; Geerken & Gove, 1983) or have found an effect only in particular situations (e.g., Blair & Johnson, 1992; Coltrane & Ishii-Kunz, 1992). In general, it appears that studies examining the absolute amount

of housework (e.g., those that examine the number of hours per week spent in housework) tend not to find effects of gender ideology on husbands' contributions to housework, and those that have studied relative contributions to housework (e.g., husbands' percentage of total hours spent on household tasks) typically do find effects of ideology.

Although the studies cited above and others have addressed the main effects of wives' and husbands' gender ideologies on the division of household labor, most researchers have ignored the interactive effects of ideology. One exception to this pattern is Hochschild's work (Hochschild, 1989a, 1989b) on the "economy of gratitude." She argues that "the interplay between a man's gender ideology and a woman's implies a deeper interplay between his gratitude toward her, and hers toward him" (Hochschild, 1989b, p. 18). Gender ideology is seen as determining what will be viewed, in the context of the relationship, as a "gift" and what will not. A somewhat parallel line of inquiry dealing with the "psychology of entitlement" has developed from relative deprivation theory (for example, Major, 1987, 1993, 1994; Sanchez, 1994).

Consider a couple where both wife and husband are employed full-time and where the wife subscribes to a traditional gender ideology. A traditional husband may consider that his wife's performance of most of the domestic labor (in addition to her 40 hours of paid employment) is consistent with his expectations of married women; he may view himself as "entitled" to her domestic labor. A more egalitarian husband, on the other hand, is likely to see his wife's domestic labor as a gift to him because he doesn't feel that he is necessarily entitled to her domestic work.

For comparative purposes, imagine another couple, both of whom are employed full-time, but where the wife holds a relatively egalitarian gender ideology. The traditional husband "expects" his wife to do most of the housework because that is consistent with his ideology. Like his counterpart married to the traditionally oriented wife, he does not view her housework as a gift, but rather as an entitlement. The egalitarian husband married to an egalitarian wife, on the other hand, might see his wife's "fair share" of domestic labor as an entitlement because both he and his wife believe that married couples are "supposed" to share the domestic workload. The egalitarian wife's contributions beyond her fair share might be viewed as a gift.

But what about the husbands' contributions to domestic work? Which of these husbands is likely to make the greatest contribution to the completion of household chores? Neither the economy of gratitude nor the psychology of entitlement directly address such a question. One might speculate that traditional husbands would view their wives' domestic labor as an entitlement and that an egalitarian husband would view any domestic labor his wife might perform as gift. But knowing how wives and husbands view their spouses' contributions to housework tells us little about how much housework a given spouse is likely to perform or what form the overall division of household labor might take.

To understand this phenomenon, I appeal to another perspective, that of "doing gender" (Berk, 1985; West & Zimmerman, 1987). West and Zimmerman argue that

it is not simply that household labor is designated as "women's work," but that for a woman to engage in it and a man not to engage in it is to draw on and exhibit the "essential nature" of each. (p. 144)

Berk and West and Zimmerman appear to conceptualize the normative prescriptions and proscriptive associated with gender as some unitary, monolithic structure, as if there were a single culturally defined "male identity" and a single culturally defined "female identity." On the other hand, I see gender ideologies and identities as varying across individuals. One man may see "being male" as proscribing the performance of domestic labor; another may perceive that "being male" implies an equal partnership with his wife in the arenas of economics and domestic labor.

The idea that wives and husbands do gender by allocating housework responsibilities unequally, combined with the assumption that gender ideologies, although socially determined, vary across individuals, leads us to new insights concerning the allocation of domestic labor on the basis of wives' and husbands' gender ideologies. Certainly, a traditional wife is doing gender when she does most of the housework in addition to her full-time paid employment. And it is apparent that a traditional husband is doing gender when he contributes little to the performance of household chores; to do otherwise would violate his own beliefs about the appropriateness of men doing women's work. Not surprisingly, I expect to find that traditional husbands married to traditional wives will do the smallest proportion of domestic labor.

Consider a more complex situation. An egalitarian wife can do gender by encouraging or "allowing" her husband to increase his contribution to domestic work because sharing the domestic labor is an integral component of her egalitarian beliefs. But what if her husband is traditional? The traditional husband does gender by not contributing significantly to the completion of household tasks because not doing housework is consistent with his gender ideology. Even if his wife cuts back on the number of hours she spends doing household work, either by finding someone else—her children, for example, or purchasing domestic help in the marketplace—to do those tasks, or by simply not getting them done at all, the traditional husband's overall proportion of household work is not likely to change substantially. Thus, I predict that there will be little difference in the proportion of domestic labor performed by traditional husbands married to traditional wives compared with those married to egalitarian wives.

On the other hand, I expect to find a very different situation for egalitarian husbands. For such men, making relatively larger contributions to domestic labor is consistent with their gender ideology. Egalitarian husbands married to traditional wives are in a qualitatively different situation than those married to more egalitarian women. Traditional wives do gender by doing most of the housework *and* by not allowing their husbands to contribute. For such wives, a husband is not supposed to contribute substantially around the home, especially in terms of women's work such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry. Thus, I argue that an understanding of the effects of gender ideology on husbands' contributions to domestic labor must take into account the interaction between the husband's and the wife's gender ideologies. I predict that, although egalitarian husbands married to egalitarian wives will have the most balanced division of household labor, there will be a substantial difference in the proportion of household chores done by egalitarian husbands across the continuum of the wife's gender ideology.

In operational terms, I am predicting that (net of other factors related to the division of household labor) there will be an interaction between wives' and husbands' gender ideologies in terms of their joint effects on the husband's contributions to domestic work. Specifically, I hypothesize that the husband's traditionalism will be negatively related to the proportion of total household task hours contributed by the husband for men married to egalitarian wives but not for men

with traditionally oriented wives, and, furthermore, that husbands will do relatively little domestic labor unless both they and their wives hold relatively nontraditional beliefs about gender and marital roles.

If husbands and wives are truly doing gender when they develop a division of household labor, one would expect to find such interactions not only on the overall proportion of domestic work contributed by the husband but on the proportion of traditionally female household tasks performed by the husband, as well. Such interactions also might exist for the proportion of traditionally male tasks (for example, yard work and auto maintenance) and gender-neutral tasks (for example, bill paying) done by the husband, but such effects would not be nearly so compelling as evidence to support the doing gender hypothesis.

Note that I am not predicting an interaction of wives' and husbands' ideologies in terms of their effects on actual hours spent by husbands in domestic labor; rather, my hypotheses concern husbands' relative, not absolute, contributions to domestic work. There may or may not be effects of gender ideology on absolute contributions to household labor, but such differences are not as theoretically interesting as differences in relative contributions to housework for two reasons. First, the absolute number of hours of housework performed by husbands (and by wives, for that matter) almost certainly varies greatly along such dimensions as social class and household structure. Upper-class women are more likely to substitute market goods and services for nonmarket goods and services; working class women must clean and cook themselves. Second, a focal concern in this literature has been the division of household labor as an indicator or consequence of relative power or distributive justice in the relationship. My concern is how the husband's contributions to domestic labor compare with those of his wife, not simply how much domestic labor he performs.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

The data for these analyses come from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH; Sweet, Bumpass, & Call, 1988), a national probability sample of 13,017 adult respondents interviewed in 1987 or 1988. In married couple households and cohabiting households, a questionnaire also was administered to the respondent's spouse or partner. The analyses here focus on the 2,719 married couples with both

husband and wife under age 65 who provided codable responses to all of the items under study. All analyses used the NSFH couple weights to adjust for oversampling, differential probabilities of selection, and differential response rates.

Dependent Variables: Indicators of Household Labor

Each spouse was asked to indicate "the approximate number of hours per week that you, your spouse/partner, or others in the household normally spend" preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, doing outdoor tasks, shopping, washing and ironing, paying bills, doing auto maintenance, and driving other household members to work and school. Time spent in these tasks was totaled into three groups: traditionally female tasks (preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, washing and ironing, and grocery shopping), traditionally male tasks (yard work, auto maintenance), and gender-neutral tasks (paying bills, driving other household members), as well as total time spent in all household tasks. These distinctions were based on evidence from a qualitative study of domestic work involvement (e.g., Coltrane, 1989) and other studies of the NSFH data set (e.g., Blair & Lichter, 1991). Blair and Lichter's Table 1, for example, shows that wives spend at least twice as many hours as their husbands on meal preparation, grocery shopping, washing dishes, doing laundry, and cleaning house. Husbands, on the other hand, spend far more time than their wives on auto maintenance and yard work. The amount of time spent on paying bills and driving other family members is about equal between NSFH husbands and wives. For all household tasks and for each of the three subgroups, I calculated the husband's proportion of the total time spent doing that particular task.

In order to minimize the number cases lost due to missing data on a small number of the household task items, missing responses to the task items for respondents who responded to at least seven of the nine individual tasks were coded as having spent 0 hours in that activity. Those who responded "some time spent (amount of time unspecified)" were coded as having spent 1 hour in that activity. I also experimented with alternative methods of dealing with the missing data (for example, coding all missing data as 0 hours and substituting the mean value for the "some amount spent [amount of time unspecified]" response). Consistent with the findings of South and Spitze

(1994) from this same data set, I found that my substantive conclusions were essentially unaffected by the treatment of the missing data.

Inspection of the NSFH household labor data indicates numerous respondents who reported more than 168 total hours per week in domestic labor plus market labor. Such responses may reflect invalidity in the self-reports of hours spent in household labor or (more likely) the fact that many household tasks are performed concurrently. To adjust for this problem, any respondent who reported spending over 100 hours per week in any one activity was coded as having spent 100 hours in that activity. Similarly, totals for task groups (female, male, and gender-neutral tasks) were held to a maximum of 100 hours.

Independent Variables: Traditionalism

NSFH respondents were asked a series of questions that were used to construct a summated scale of gender ideology. On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 = *strongly approve* and 7 = *strongly disapprove*, respondents were asked how much they approved of "mothers who work full-time when their youngest child is under age 5" and "mothers who work part-time when their youngest child is under age 5." On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = *strongly agree* and 5 = *strongly disagree*, respondents also were asked how much they agreed with the following four items: "It is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and family," "preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is employed," "parents should encourage just as much independence from their daughters as in their sons," and "if a husband and wife both work full-time, they should share housework tasks equally." Appropriate item scoring was reversed to produce a scale where higher scores indicate more traditional gender ideologies. Because the items had different ranges, the items were first standardized and then summed, yielding a Cronbach's α of .68 for the wives and .66 for the husbands. To avoid creating a scale with negative values (and making interpretation of interaction effects more difficult), the summated scores were standardized to a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.

Control Variables

There are a number of background characteristics of the husbands, their wives, and their marriages

that I included in the model as statistical controls. Marital-specific capital variables include the duration of the current marriage, the number of related children in the household, and the wife's age. A squared term for the number of children was included in the models because the literature (e.g., Kamo, 1991) suggests that the effects of the number of children on the division of household labor may be nonlinear. Market-specific capital variables include the wife's and husband's education in years, the wife's and husband's hours employed per week, the wife's annual earnings, and the husband's proportion of total family earnings. Because it is likely that the division of household labor varies across ethnic, regional, and urban-rural groups, I included measures of the husband's race, region of residence, and whether the couple lived in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Finally, recall that the NSFH procedures involved interviewing a primary respondent. Then, if the primary respondent was married or cohabiting, the primary respondent's spouse or partner was given a self-administered questionnaire to complete and return. One anonymous *JMF* reviewer suggested that the gender of the primary respondent might affect the overall responses to the household task variables because, although both primary and secondary respondents completed the household task information in response to a self-administered questionnaire, the primary respondents filled out the questionnaire in the presence of the interviewer, but the secondary respondents completed the questionnaire independently. Additional analyses of the task data (not reported here; tabulations are available from the author) indicate that there are, indeed, differences in responses between husbands who were primary respondents and those who were secondary respondents. In general, husbands who were primary respondents tended to report spending more time doing the household tasks. Consequently, an indicator of whether the husband was the primary respondent was included in all analyses.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents weighted means and standard deviations for the entire sample of couples. Overall, the men and women and the marriages in the sample are fairly representative of the population of married men and women and of marriages that existed during the study period (1987–1988). The

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
VARIABLES IN ANALYSES

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Duration of marriage in years	17.43	11.11
Race of husband		
African American	4.8%	
Hispanic	5.2%	
Wife's education (in years)	13.16	2.40
Husband's education (in years)	13.50	2.79
Region of residence		
Northeast	19.1%	
North Central	28.1%	
South	33.2%	
Residing in metropolitan area	76.3%	
Number of related children in household	1.23	1.21
Wife's annual earnings	\$11,274	\$20,476
Husband's annual earnings	\$34,531	\$45,126
Percentage of family income earned by husband	70.0%	0.29
Wife's labor		
Hours of paid employment per week	21.37	19.22
Total hours in domestic labor per week	37.61	20.65
Percentage of all hours spent in domestic labor	63.4%	18.29
Percentage of hours spent in female tasks	73.5%	19.66
Percentage of hours spent in male tasks	19.9%	24.35
Percentage of hours spent in gender-neutral tasks	56.4%	32.53
Husband's labor		
Hours of paid employment per week	40.60	17.92
Total hours in domestic labor per week	18.12	14.20
Percentage of all hours spent in domestic labor	31.1%	17.29
Percentage of hours spent in female tasks	20.4%	17.73
Percentage of hours spent in male tasks	70.5%	29.27
Percentage of hours spent in gender-neutral tasks	40.9%	31.97
Hours per week in domestic labor by children	3.03	7.14
Hours per week in domestic labor by others	1.64	8.93
Wife's traditionalism score	98.86	14.64
Husband's traditionalism score	99.33	14.91

Note: Unweighted $n = 2,719$ married couples for all analyses. Standard deviations are omitted for dummy variables.

couples had been married an average of 18 years. About 5% of the husbands are Black, and about 6% are Hispanic. The husbands and their wives tend to have some postsecondary education, with means of 13.5 and 13.2 years of formal education, respectively. The husbands averaged approximately \$34,500 in annual earnings, about 70% of total family income. The households had an average of 1.2 children under the age of 18 years.

The descriptive statistics on the division of household labor are generally consistent with those of previous studies. Wives average about 38 hours per week in household tasks (exclusive of child care), and husbands average about 18 hours. Wives contribute about 63% of the hours spent on all household labor; husbands, about 31%. The remaining 6% was accounted for by children and others. As noted in previous research, the household tasks were heavily segregated by gender. Wives perform about 74% of the hours spent on traditionally female tasks, and husbands contribute about 20%. On the other hand, husbands contribute about 70% of the hours spent on tradi-

tionally male tasks, whereas wives contribute about 19%. Husbands contribute about 41% of the hours spent on gender-neutral tasks; wives, about 56%. Children, on the average, contribute about 3 hours of domestic labor per week, and other household members add another 1.6 hours per week.

OLS Regression Analyses

Table 2 presents metric (unstandardized) ordinary least squares coefficients for multiple regression analyses predicting four different indicators of husbands' domestic labor: husbands' percentage of hours spent in all domestic labor, husbands' percentage of hours spent in traditionally female tasks, husbands' percentage of hours spent in traditionally male tasks, and husbands' percentage of hours spent in gender-neutral tasks.


The model predicting the effects on the husband's proportion of total hours spent doing domestic labor fits the data quite well, accounting for about 35% of the variation in the dependent

TABLE 2. OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING MEASURES OF HUSBAND'S DOMESTIC LABOR

Variable	Husband's Percentage of Total Hours Spent On			
	All Domestic Labor	"Female" Tasks	"Male" Tasks	Gender-Neutral Tasks
Adjusted model R^2	.348*	.330*	.083*	.053*
Husband primary respondent?	1.43*	1.12*	2.05	3.05*
Duration of marriage	-0.10*	-0.17*	-0.11*	-0.05
Race of husband				
African American	3.06*	1.90	4.49	5.82*
Hispanic	1.11	1.99	2.34	3.44
Education of wife	0.13	0.14	0.16	-0.77*
Education of husband	0.05	0.26*	-0.24	1.53*
Region of residence				
Northeast	-3.08*	-2.36*	-2.73	1.55
North Central	-0.52	-1.16	-1.57	1.79
South	-1.66*	-2.15*	1.75	-1.72
Metropolitan residence?	0.30	0.73	1.56	2.69
Number of children	-0.97*	-1.14*	1.72	-3.72*
Number of children squared	0.20	0.29*	-0.14	0.49*
Wife's annual earnings (in \$1,000)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
Husband's proportion of total family income	-1.93	-2.26*	-1.56	6.05*
Wife's hours employed	0.08*	0.10*	0.11*	-0.03
Husband's hours employed	-0.11*	-0.14*	-0.03	-0.10*
Wife's domestic hours	-0.37*	-0.31*	-0.23*	-0.26*
Domestic labor by children	-0.13*	-0.10*	-0.64*	0.11
Domestic labor by others	-0.11*	-0.06	-0.26*	-0.04
Wife's traditionalism	-0.48*	-0.60*	0.21	-0.06
Husband's traditionalism	-0.49*	-0.65*	0.25	-0.08
Interaction of wife's and husband's traditionalism	0.004*	0.005*	-0.002	0.001
Intercept	107.31*	110.03*	60.58*	49.95*

Note: A* indicates that the coefficient is at least twice its standard error, or $p < .05$. Table entries are unstandardized (metric) OLS regression coefficients. Unweighted $n = 2,719$ married couples for all analyses.

FIGURE 1. INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF HUSBAND'S AND WIFE'S GENDER IDEOLOGIES ON HUSBAND'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DOMESTIC LABOR



variable. Notice that the husbands' contributions to domestic labor are sensitive to the amount of market work they and their wives perform. As the husband's hours of employment increases, his proportion of hours spent in domestic labor decreases; as the wife's hours of employment increases, the husband's contributions increase. Measures of marital-specific capital also are related to the proportion of domestic labor performed by husbands. The share of domestic labor performed by the husband decreases when marital duration increases. The number of children is related to the husband's share of household labor in a linear but negative way.

African American husbands do a statistically significant greater share of household labor. Husbands in the Northeast and South do significantly less domestic labor than husbands in the West. Husbands' contributions to domestic labor are negatively related to wives' domestic work hours. Husbands' share of domestic work decreases when contributions by children and by others increase.

As hypothesized, there is a statistically significant interaction between wives' and husbands' gender ideologies. The nature of this interaction is depicted in Figure 1. Note that for men married to

the most traditional women (represented along the front of the figure), the husband's gender ideology has little effect on the percentage of domestic labor he performs. The conditional slope of the husband's traditionalism for men married to the most traditional wives is 0.048 (with $s_e = 0.041$, $t = 1.2$); thus, for men married to the most traditional wives there is no statistically significant effect of husband's traditionalism on percentage of housework performed.

On the other hand, there is an effect for men married to the most nontraditional or egalitarian women (represented along the back of the figure). The conditional slope of the husband's traditionalism for men married to the most egalitarian women is -0.198 (with $s_e = 0.038$, $t = -5.2$). The contributions of the most egalitarian husbands are negatively and significantly related to their wives' traditionalism; egalitarian men married to egalitarian women (the back left-hand corner of the figure) do the largest percentage of housework, and egalitarian men married to traditional women (the front left-hand corner) do much less.

In general, the slope of husband's traditionalism on percentage of housework performed is negative and statistically significant for men mar-

ried to women whose traditionalism scores were from slightly above the mean to below the mean. For men married to women whose traditionalism scores were more than about a half a standard deviation above the mean, there is no statistically significant effect of the husband's traditionalism on the percentage of domestic labor done by the husband.

A similar interaction effect is apparent for husbands' contributions to female household tasks. The model accounts for about 33% of the variation in husbands' contributions to female tasks. There is a statistically significant interaction between husbands' and wives' gender ideologies: The level of a husband's contributions to domestic labor is related to his wife's ideology for egalitarian husbands but not for more traditional husbands. The nature of these interactions is similar to that depicted for all domestic labor in Figure 1. For men married to traditional women, the husband's gender ideology has little effect on his contributions to the performance of female tasks. For men married to egalitarian women, on the other hand, the husband's gender ideology has a strong effect on the proportion of hours spent on female tasks.

The interaction between husbands' and wives' gender ideologies fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance for contributions to traditionally male tasks and for gender-neutral tasks.

On a methodological note, observe that husbands who were primary respondents reported contributing a significantly greater share of all domestic work and specifically of the female and gender-neutral tasks. One possible interpretation of this finding is that husbands who completed the task items in the presence of the interviewer felt compelled, through some type of social desirability process, to overestimate the amount of time spent on household tasks. It is important to note, however, that this variable has only an additive effect on the results. Additional analyses (not reported here, but available from the author) show that whether the husband was the primary or secondary respondent does not interact with any of the other variables in the analyses and does not affect the results of the interaction tests.

DISCUSSION

I began this article by asserting that, although gender ideology undoubtedly affects the division of household labor, it is not sufficient to examine

merely the main effects of wives' and husbands' gender ideologies. Rather, it is essential to consider the interaction between the ideologies of wives and their husbands in order to understand how a division of household labor emerges. The conceptual approach employed here draws on West and Zimmerman's doing gender perspective. I hypothesized that a husband's gender ideology is not related to the division of household labor for men married to traditional wives, but that it is for men with egalitarian wives.

The analyses presented in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis. There are statistically significant interactions between wives' and husbands' gender ideologies in terms of their effects on the overall division of household labor and on the division of traditionally female tasks such as cooking and laundry. Husbands' contributions to domestic labor are related to the husband's gender ideology for men married to egalitarian women. Husbands' contributions decrease as gender ideology becomes more traditional. For men married to traditional women, on the other hand, there is little relationship between the husband's gender ideology and his share of domestic labor.

Further insights about the nature of the interaction between husbands' and wives' gender ideologies can be gained by examining Figure 1. As might be expected, the most domestic labor is performed by the least traditional men married to the least traditional women (the back left-hand corner of Figure 1). Because a husband's gender ideology does not affect his contributions to domestic labor when his wife is traditional, husbands at two other extremes—the most traditional men married to the most traditional women (the front-right-hand corner of the figure) and the least traditional men married to the most traditional women (the front left-hand corner of the figure)—do approximately the same percentage of domestic labor. Finally, note that even when they are married to relatively egalitarian women, traditional husbands do relatively little domestic labor (the back right-hand corner of Figure 1). In summary, husbands do relatively little domestic labor unless both they and their wives are relatively nontraditional in their beliefs about gender and marital roles.

How do these findings inform our existing theoretical knowledge concerning the division of household labor? First, they suggest that the dismissal of the importance of gender ideologies in the development of a division of household labor may be ill-advised. Recent scholarship has pre-

sented a number of promising new approaches to understanding the relative contributions of men and women to domestic labor (e.g., Brines, 1993, 1994; Greenstein, 1996; Sanchez, 1994) that have the potential to revitalize this area of theory and research. It seems unlikely that we can attain a complete understanding of the phenomenon of the division of household labor through purely microeconomic approaches or purely structural sociological approaches; we will need to merge these theories with a strong social-psychological underpinning, as well. Researchers need to conceptualize gender ideology as a variable (rather than as a culturally specific constant) and recognize that when social actors produce or reproduce gender through the division of household labor, they are reflecting their own personal gender ideologies.

Second, these findings remind us that the division of household labor by couples is an ongoing, dynamic process that is the result of an interactive negotiation. As such, it requires us to study not only characteristics of husbands and wives as individuals but the interactions (both statistical and social) between them.

Third, these findings suggest another, more sociological alternative to the primarily economic approaches (e.g., Becker, 1991) to the study of domestic labor that have claimed primacy in this area of research. The inclusion of gender ideology in our theorizing helps us to understand why the household economics perspective has failed to adequately account for gender-based inequalities in the division of household labor.

What do these findings suggest for future trends in the division of household labor? One can view the glass as either half empty or half full. On the one hand, only one quarter of the husbands in this study contributed as much as 40% of all hours spent on domestic labor in their household. On the other hand, the effects of gender ideology noted here imply that as more and more husbands and wives become committed to egalitarian partnerships in marriage, the relative contributions of husbands to domestic labor will almost certainly increase. The interaction between husbands' and wives' gender ideologies suggests that a major reason why increases in women's employment have not been accompanied by comparable changes in husband's contributions to domestic work is that husbands' gender ideologies have not kept pace with those of their wives in the shift from traditional "separate spheres" ideologies to more egalitarian beliefs.

NOTE

The National Survey of Families and Households was funded by Grant No. HD21009 from the Center for Population Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. The survey was designed and carried out at the Center for Demography and Ecology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison under the direction of Larry Bumpass and James Sweet. The field work was done by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University. This article has benefited greatly from discussions with Maxine Atkinson, Stephen Blackwelder, and Barbara Risman. The analyses and interpretations herein are those of the author.

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